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It may be inferred, from the title I have 
given to the present lecture, that I might want to 
resurrect oíd and now tiresome arguments and 
academic disquisitions about the inscription of 
High Modernism within the literary canon or within 
literary history. Indeed, the simple naming of two 
such canonical figures in Anglo-American Poetry as 
Eliot and Stevens, and even more, the antagonistic 
stance that the title shows, imply a series of 
previous moves on the part of the speaker that I am 
willing to acknowledge, only to a certain extent. 
The strategies along this inquisitorial course of 
evaluations, devaluations and revaluations are 
well-known to every student of Modernism. They 
begin with a positing of a certain mode of High 
Modernism, best exemplified in Eliot, Joyce, Pound, 
et al., as a central breaking point, and point of 
no return in Literature and Poetics, a literary 
revolution of such an extent and import, that 
subsequent literature feels entrapped in a sort of 
solipsism from which it is very difficult to get 
out. Modernism and Post-Modernism are thus the 
double moon-faces of the intellectual debate in 
which most of us are engaged at the present moment. 
Nevertheless, the position about the ñames and 
natures of Modernism is still far from clear, and 
agreement has not been reached yet. We have a 
series of working oppositions within the discourse 
of Modernism that we could summarize as follows: 
Modernism as a very special creation of Anglo-
American Poetics, uniquely attached to a certain 
historical construct which is historically and 
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intellectually discernible in the theoretical 
dlscourse about "Modernity," "Modernitat" or "La 
modernité." Central to this view is the belief of a 
certaln historical and epistemológica! crisis at 
the beginning of the century which is the final 
step in the development of the "welstanchaung" of 
the Enlightenment with its subsequent and well-
known tenets like the idea of progress, even human 
progress, perfectibility, dehumanization of art, 
time and space as reasonable concepts, etc. etc. 
The air of "deja vu" of these tenets doesn't 
prevent them from being used and misused in 
explaining the opacity and difficulty of Eliot and 
Pound's poetry. Moreover, this view is charged with 
a certain kind of Historical Necessity and 
Inevitability, as if the course of literature 
wouldn't have had the minimal opportunity but to 
progress along those lines. Modernism, holds such a 
view, was the only movement attuned to the wastings 
of World War I, the collapse of faith in social and 
economic institutions, the rise of Fascist and 
Communist totalitarianism, and the exposure of the 
structural weaknesses in the capitalist system. It 
is to be pointed out that a disaffection with 
civilization as it existed is a strong undercurrent 
which will reverse the view of the modernist as 
modern, in the sense in which modernism meant 
industrial capitalism, secularism, the break up of 
oíd communities, the emergence of new economic-
social classes whose feeling for tradition 
consisted, if it existed at all, in the acquisition 
of its furnishings. (The example of the Fugitives 
and New Criticism with its radical opposition 
poetry-science is a good case in point and the very 
embodiment of this cultural concept of Modernism.) 
Opposing this view of Modernism, we have such 
different discourses as Jameson's and Bloom's or 
Bornstein's in which, from different perspectives, 
the centrality and the specificity of High 
Modernism as such are being challenged, on the one 
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hand, from a basically epistemológica! perspectiva, 
as is the case of Jameson, and on the other, from a 
basically literary perspective, as in the case of 
Bloom and Bornstein whose predicaments are well-
known. Modernism is not a radical point of 
departure but a following up of premisas already 
present in romantic positionings about the working 
of the imagination and the duality positionings 
about the working of the imagination and the 
duality object and subject within the process of 
creativity. 
Moreover, this antagonistic stance conceals a 
more basic duality: the questioning of tradition 
and of a tradition of a privileged British 
discourse which impinges upon and dominates a 
native and vernacular American discourse. There is 
a sense in which the reaction of American poets 
against Eliot and their adopting as a master 
narrative of his poetry that of Willieuns Carlos 
Williams, or Stevens, can be seen as a 
revolutionary distancing from colonial forms of 
privileged discourses, alien to a native 
experience of language, and more important, to a 
native experience of troping that language, which 
cannot silence or overwrite such examples as the 
"democratic poetic I" of Walt Whitman, or the self-
reliant pronouncements and models of Emerson. 
Embedded in this question are interesting and 
problematic issues about the concept of Tradition 
itself, which we have no time to deal with now. 
Nevertheless I would like to emphasize this 
position, since the notion of a privileged form of 
discourse seems nowadays well-established, 
especially after Foucault's analysis of the 
strategies of power implicit in the given discourse 
of the community. In addition to that, the self-
consciousness of the High Moderns, the "Making it 
New" of Ezra Pound, and notably the crltical essays 
and editorial work of T.S. Eliot are commonly 
regarded as stages in a well-thought out plan for 
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"Modernising" literature, for foregrounding a 
certain way of writing, and of imposing to a 
certain extent their own points of view upon 
literature and its practitioners at a particular 
given moment in History whose High Priests they 
considered themselves to be. Their self-
consciousness and, more important, their monolithic 
interpretations of History and Poetics, which 
excluded any marginal position, and consequently, 
any marginal poetic practice, seem to me central to 
understand in perspective the Modern Movement. How 
could we take otherwise the fact that two 
strangers, one born in Idaho and the other in St. 
Louis effected what has come to be known as the 
major revolution in British Poetic History? It 
seems to me that this perspective of a hegemonic, 
privileged discourse, imposed from the outside; the 
willingness to créate a movement; and especially 
their sustained efforts at creating an adequate 
audience should be kept in mind when analysing 
their poetry. 
So far I have been trying to summarize the 
assumptions that are "hidden" behind my personal 
approach to the subject. And I emphasize the term 
hidden, because my approach is not determined by 
them, though necessarily they stand in the 
background. My point of departure has been a 
personal experience of the reading of the poetry of 
Eliot and Stevens. Paramount to this is the fact of 
my being a foreigner, and thus approaching their 
poetry from a continental, necessarily Spanish 
perspective which reads their tropes at a second 
remove from their original stance and for which the 
imaginative products that their languages creates 
are received from a certain set of expectations in 
which assumptions about cultural constructs such as 
American Literature or the British Literary 
tradition are operative. I mean to say by this that 
the introduction of the figure of Phlebas the 
Phoenician in The Waste Land is received from a 
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certaln perspective to somebody born and well-
acquainted with the historical construct of the 
Mediterranean, and the rhetorical figures that have 
accompanied its appearance in history. Conversely, 
taking a poem such as "An Ordinary Evening in New 
Haven" or "The Auroras of Autunin" by Stevens, 
conveys to me, a Spanish reader of American 
literature a different set of expectations about 
what America as an imaginativo construct is and the 
referents subsumed in its discourse. There is for 
instance a certain whiteness which strikes the 
European reader as very American, a certain quality 
of light, which, of course, when you study American 
Literature, you come to associate with an 
Emersonian perspective, through such key terms as 
"transparency", the "whiteness" of the "Whale" 
etc. which are operative in the search of a 
symbolic language with which to penétrate nature, 
which runs a course in the American literature of 
the great Renaissance, in such great examples as 
Hawthorne, Melville, Emerson, and which only a New 
England early morning can show you how to 
comprehend. 
Personal experience of reading these two 
poets, thus, is the first step of my reflections on 
them. What follows then, is not an analysis of 
their work, which I am in no position to produce, 
and which nevertheless in claiming to offer a 
parallel theoretical or explanatory discourse about 
the meaning of the poetry or more specifically 
about what their poetry is about would be 
essentially reductive, and consequently false or at 
least of no interest, since it will be a form of 
closure, but certain questions that arise directly 
from the experience of the poems and which I think 
can be related to the workings or strategies of 
address, of rhetoric going on in the poems 
themselves. 
Let me posit two examples, which can be two 
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passages that are well-known to people familiar 
with Ánglo-American literature. The first one is 
the opening of "The Fire Sermón" in Eliot's Waste 
Land; 
The river's tent is broken; the last fingers 
ofleaf / 
Clutch and sink into the wet bank. The wind 
Crosses the brownland, unheard. The nymphs are 
departed / 
Sweet Thames, run softly, till I end my song. 
The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich 
papers,/ 
Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, 
cigarette ends/ 
Or other testimony of summer nights.The 
nymphs are departed./ 
And their friends, the loitering heirs of City 
directors;/ 
Departed, have left no addresses. 
By the waters of Leman I sat dovm and wept... 
Sweet Thames, run softly till I end my song, 
Sweet Thames, run softly, for I speak not loud 
or long./ 
But at my back in a cold blast I hear 
The rattle of the bones, and chuckle spread 
from ear to ear/ 
A rat crept softly through the vegetation 
Dragging its slimy belly on the bank 
While I was fishing in the dull canal 
On a winter evening round behind the gashouse 
Musing upon the king my brother's wreck 
And on the king my father's death before him. 
White bodies naked on the low damp ground 
And bones cast in a little low dry garret, 
Rattled by the rat's foot only, year to year. 
But at my back from time to time I hear 
The sound of horns and motors, which shall 
bring/ 
Sweeney to Mrs Porter in the spring. 
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Sweeney to Mrs Porter in the spring. 
O the moon shone bright on Mrs. Porter 
And on her daughter 
They wash their feet in soda water 
Et O ees vois d'enfants, chantant dans la 
coupolel/ 
Twit, Twit, Twit 
Jug, Jug, Jug, 
Opposing this I could quote two such different 
poems of Wallace Stevens as: 
The house was quiet and the world was calm. 
The reader became the book; and summer night 
Was like the conscious being of the book. 
The house was quiet and the world was calm. 
The words were spoken as if there was no book, 
Except that the reader leaned above the page, 
Wanted to lean, wanted much most to be 
The scholar to whom his book is true, to whom 
The summer night is like a perfection of 
thought./ 
The house was quiet because it had to be. 
The quiet was part of the meaning, part of the 
mind:/ 
The access of perfection to the page. 
As the world was calm. The truth in a calm 
world,/ 
In which there is no other meaning, itself 
Is calm, itself is summer and night, itself 
Is the reader leaning late and reading there 
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Farewell to an idea.... A cabin strands, 
Deserted, on a beach. It is white, 
As by a custom or according to 
An ancestral theme or as a consequence 
Of an infinite course. The flowers against the 
wall/ 
Are white, a little dried, a kind of mark 
Reminding, trying or duller, whether of winter 
cloud/ 
Or of winter sky, from horizon to horizon 
The wind is blowing the sand across the floor 
Here being visible is being white, 
Is being of the solid of white, the 
accomplishment/ 
Of an extremist in an exercise... 
The season changes. A cold wind chills the 
beach./ 
The long lines of it grow longer, emptier, 
A darkness gathers though it does not fall 
And the whiteness grows less vivid on the 
wall./ 
The man who is walking turns blankly on the 
sand. / 
He observes how the north is always enlarging 
the change,/ 
With its frigid brilliances, its blue-red 
sweeps/ 
And gusts of great enkindlings, its polar 
green,/ 
The color of ice and fire and solitude. 
The reading of these examples leads me to a 
series of observations. The first lines belong, as 
you all know, to the Waste Land and I could have 
chosen the beginning, "April is the cruelest month. 
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breeding lllacs out of the dead land, mlxlng 
memory and desire, stirring dull roots with spring 
rain. Winter kepts us warm. . . . "etc. It is 
inevitable that we read them with the so called 
"Waste Land Ethos" in the back of our minds, and 
consequently with a certain feeling of awe towards 
one of the "accepted great poetical moniunents" of 
our tradition. But in trying to libérate ourselves 
from that attitude, what is undeniable is that the 
reader feels the experience of reading something 
which is "difficult" and for whose appreciation he 
must master a set of techniques or of certain clues 
or secrets hidden in the poems. The opening passage 
from the "Fire Sermón," is within Eliot's poetics 
easy enough to comprehend. It opens with a 
declarative sentence which impinges upon the reader 
with the forcé of an image which has the hardness 
that Pound asked of imagistic and modern poetry: 
"the last fingers of leaf clutch and sink into the 
wet bank." The image of desolation which --we have 
been taught-- is the objective correlative of the 
Waste Land is being presented, "objectively" to us, 
through a perceptive and narrative eye which is 
able to tell us that the "wind crosses the brown 
land unheard." Then the note of desolation is 
introduced, "the nymphs are departed" and with it a 
personal tone that contrasts with the pretended 
"objectivity" of the image. More than that, it 
introduces us into the realm of the "literary" and 
the "mythological," taking us towards a f orm of a 
myth of origins, a melancholy nostalgia for the 
time when the nymphs were not departed, inscribing 
a duality of the here, desolated, versus, the 
then, complete, people by nymphs. Immediately 
afterwards the "Sweet Thames, run softly, till I 
end my song" emphasizes even more this 
recuperative, organic myth, with the reference to 
the famous epithalamion from where it is taken. Our 
not knowing the origin of the quotation and the 
referentiality which it introduces in the poem, 
need not deter the reader from experiencing the 
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cadenee of a verse written long ago, whose diction 
is in full contrast with the "fingers of leaf which 
clutch." A full stop, and without a transition we 
are again Into the demonio of London mass 
civilization, empty bottles, sandwich papers, and 
the final coda, as a way of reuniting the 
sensibility of the reader. And then again the 
already known inhabitants of the dreadful city, 
another image which is followed by the introduction 
of a first person, which breaks the continuity of 
the objective images of the poems, and introduces a 
personal "I" which makes us think of the prophet 
crying at Babylonia of the lost Jerusalem. Spenser 
again, and then Marvell. Rattle of bones, instead 
of winged chariots. Nevertheless, the same 
nostalgia for the lost nymphs of a precluded world. 
A sudden break, and again the forcé of the image, 
the underground image: the rat dragging its slimy 
belly behind the gashouse. A reference about the 
loss/death of the father, which is also a reference 
to The Tempest and to kingdoms lost and found, to 
be followed by naked bodies, dry garrets and rat's 
foot, Marvell again, a familiar person, Sweeney. A 
French verse, and a couple of onomatopeic words. 
The predominant rhetoric that Eliot uses 
throughout the poem is that derived from Imagist 
Aesthetics, that was formulated famously and 
succinctly in the well-known Pound article "A Few 
Dont's by an Imagist:" "direct treatment of the 
thing," "hardness of the image," "disappearance of 
the subject," etc. and which has been described and 
analyzed under the concept of negativity in such 
now familiar terms as de-formation, de-
per sonalization, de-humanization and dissonance. 
T.S. Eliot*s well-known phrase in this respect is 
the "dissonance of the destructive imagination." We 
have thus a poetic paradigm in which the first act 
of inscription is a perception/imagination which 
decomposes the whole of creation: a destructive 
process at the beginning of any act of creation. 
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Thls process operates along a double Une: flrst a 
process of "entrealiserung" by which the 
imagination transforms reality into something 
unreal, a scenery of ruins, a waste land, the 
"unreal City" of Eliot, and a second phase or 
"entpersonlichung," through which it is attempted 
to neutralize the lyrical person, the "I" who sees 
and perceives, whose personal formulation we find 
in Eliot's theory of the objective correlative and 
of the necessary objectivity to conform to the 
contemporary waste land. Eliot's success is to have 
been able to produce a long poem out of a theory, 
like Imagism, which in his de-formation and 
deconstruction of reality, seems to point 
inevitably to the short poems, since in a rhetoric 
of juxtapositions, sudden and broken perceptions, 
without, in principie, any consistent and shared 
support of the poem --neither a lyrical person, ñor 
a narrative line, ñor any pretense at continuity--
it is very difficult to sustain theoretically a 
justification of a long poem. It is not surprising 
that he finds the possibility of doing so in a 
literary thematization of the city, which is one of 
the great discoveries of the "modern temper" as the 
locus classicus of fragmentation and disruptive 
perceptions. This has been analyzed in all its 
implications and I think we need not dwell on it 
any longer. Nevertheless I can't resist quoting 
Walter Benjamín whose essay on Baudelaire seems to 
me apposite and moreover the most clarifying 
example of what the literary invention and 
construction of the city owes to the modern 
aesthetic; that is the city as signifier and 
referent of modern defamiliarization. Thus 
Benjamín: "The greater the share of the shock 
factor in particular impressions, the more 
constantly consciousness has to alert as a screen 
against stimuli; the more efflciently it does so, 
the less to these impressions enter experience 
(erfahrung), tending to remain in the sphere of a 
certain hour in one's life (erlebnis.)" Perhaps the 
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special achievement of shock defense may be seen in 
its function of assigning to an incident a precise 
point in time in consciousness at the cost of the 
integrity of its contents. This would be a peak of 
achievement of the intellect; it would turn the 
incident into a moment that has been lived 
(erlebnis). Without reflection there would be 
nothing but the sudden start, usually the sensation 
of fright which according to Freud, confirms the 
failure of the shock defense. Baudelaire has 
portrayed this condition in a harsh image. He 
speaks of a duel in which the artist just before 
being beaten screams in fright. The duel is the 
Creative process itself. 
"The artist just before being beaten screams 
in fright" seems to me a very apt description of 
Eliot's poetics of the juxtaposition of the image 
in The Waste Land. especially now that we know how 
fer the personal element of crisis enters into his 
poetry of objectivity. 
We have no time to enter into a long 
controversy now regarding that which refer to the 
famous theory of objectivity and depersonalization. 
I will only say that though the personal different 
"I" and "we" that come into the poems, are not, of 
course, reflections of the subjectivity of the poet 
as all of US know by now; nevertheless, he cannot 
elimínate the category of the subject in the poem. 
We have, to a certain amount, a poetical person, a 
poetical fragmented I as an example of the modern 
poetical consciousness who experiences the shock 
treatment of the contemporary waste land. There is 
a sense in which we can talk of a structure 
operating in the poem through a depersonalized 
subjectivity which transforms reality through acts 
of conscience. We are again within the real of an 
autonomous subjectivity which, and this is 
important, takes for granted a language that can be 
origlnated in a given conscience, real or imagined. 
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This has been called "the late ceremony of critical 
innocence, the readerly imagination of a self." We 
can see thus, as the poem progresses the very 
thematization of the process of depersonalization 
of that poetic subjectivity, in a series of objects 
and Images. The percelvlng conscience sees Itself 
facing an amorphous mass of materlals, 
dlsconnected, fragmented, Imposslble to asslmilate, 
and the consequent experlence --the same as the 
reader experiences-- is an absolutely overwhelmlng 
one by the sheer mass of the accumulatlon of 
disconnected fragments, which produces a sense of 
the impossiblity of arriving at any certitude or 
advancing in the cognitive process. Neil Hertz in 
The End of the Line describes thus the process: 
The wish is for a moment of blockage, when an 
indefinite and disarrayed sequence is resolved 
(at whatever sacrifice) into a one-to-one 
confrontation, when numerical excess can be 
converted into that superogatory 
Identification with the blocking agent that is 
the guarantor of the self's own integrity as 
an agent... although the moment of blockage 
might have been rendered as one of utter self-
loss, it was, even before its recuperation as 
sublime exaltation, a confirmation of the 
unitary status of the self. 
Vhat is absent from Eliot's perspective is any 
consideration of the subject as constituted by a 
received language, and parallel to that, the 
implicit assumption in the power of language to 
portray, to créate, to redeem, at least poetically, 
the alienation and dissonance of the modern world. 
I want now to consider another aspect of 
Eliot's work, having always in mind what we have 
just said. Once agreed about the loss of valúes in 
the modern world and especially about the 
experience of disintegration and dissonance which 
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i8 the specific referent of being modern, he 
theorlzes about the rendition of this experience in 
literary terms. And he sets hlmself with the 
"seriousness" of someone who believes that 
somethlng can be done, to rewrite the British 
tradition of poetry and to promote the idea of 
difficulty in literature. Thus in his essay "On 
Metaphysical Poetry" of 1921, he writes his well-
known apology for a "modernist poetry to meet 
modernist conditions:" 
We can only say that it appears likely that 
poets in our civilization, as it exists at 
present, MUST BE DIFFICULT. Our civilization 
comprehends great variety and complexity, and 
this variety and complexity, playing upon a 
refinéd sensibility, must produce various and 
complex results. The poet must become more and 
more comprehensive, more allusive, more 
indirect, in order TO FORCÉ, TO DISLÓCATE IF 
NECESSARY LANGUAGE INTO MEANING. 
In Eliot's words we observe a series of 
implicit assumptions that I consider worth 
examining. First of all, the imposition of a 
certain difficulty. I say imposition, because the 
words of Eliot make that clear, "poets must be 
difficult." What is interesting, in the second 
place, is the positing of the difficulty, as it 
were, from the outside, as if there was a sort of 
historical necessity. There is no talk of the 
difficulties inherent in language, though there is 
a certain assumption that in modern times language 
has ceased to signify. Most interesting, from my 
point of view, is the fact that Eliot posits a 
parallel series, the historical series, 
civilization, as a significant referent and, 
consequently, makes the following equation: since 
civilization has become dislocated, language must 
become dislocated too, in order to signify by 
dislocation the loss of valúes of the world. By 
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making this equation between language and the world 
(whatever he means by that equation), he assumes 
that a certain meanlng can be recuperated. We 
sense, underneath Eliot's Unes a certain belief in 
a myth of origins, in a myth of writing as 
recapturing lost meanings in the fallen world of 
humans, a sense of transcendence, of going outside 
language to recapture a wholeness of visión, and an 
assumption of the generative power of "serious and 
difficult" literature. 
No wonder, then, that some years later, he was 
to discover a certain method to substantiate and to 
historize his poetical practice. Not content with 
the sheer dislocated achievement of aggregation, 
disruption and negativity which constitutes The 
Waste Land. he discovers in Joyce's Ulysses. the 
possibility of a historical method which would 
redeem modernist writing from sheer reductionism, 
from accusations of mere babble and non-
meaningful wholeness. Thus, in his influential 
article "Ulysses. Order and Myth," Eliot describes 
his methods and ambitions more than those of Joyce. 
It makes the book sound pretentiously full of 
cultural malaise and announces not only that the 
novel is dead but that Joyce has discovered the 
"mythical method" by which it is possible to créate 
a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and 
antiquity. That Joyce uses that technique is 
obvious, though we know that it is only a grid and 
that books like Stuart Gilbert's were the 
consequence of one of the greatest jokes Joyce 
played upon us critics and readers. That the 
technique constitutes a scientific discovery might 
surprise readers of Spenser, Dante, or Milton. The 
claim to method is however preliminary to the 
larger extravagance by which Eliot goes on to make 
a cause and effect relationship between the writing 
method he describes --again, essentially his own--
and what he considers contemporary conditions: " It 
is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of 
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giving a shape and significance to the immense 
panorama of futility and anarchy which is 
contemporary history." This describes his post-
writing efforts at providing a scholarly grid to 
The Waste Land. in an attempt at necessary order. 
Eliot thus appears to us as an example of 
writers who like to endow their own practices with 
historical inevitability and large consequence. 
This in turn promotes the notion that in their work 
the rest of us can recover meanings whose absence 
would otherwise yield to chaos or to the 
blandishments of meaningless pleasure. Most 
writers, most readers want to believe in such 
magnifications of literary method and literary 
meaning. The belief is essential to the notion that 
the writing and reading of literature have a 
culturally redemptive power. I am arguing that 
this belief cannot be sustained by the actual 
operations of language in literary texts. Writing 
that can be called literature tends, it seems to 
me, to be discernibly on edge about its own 
rhetorical status, especially when the rhetoric is 
conspicuously indebted to any of the great, 
historically rooted institutions, as in the 
theological-mythological-literary saturations of 
idiom in Paradise Lost. Ulysses or The Waste Land. 
Part of the excitement derives from the way such 
works resist as well as absorb the meanings which 
their adopted language makes available to them. 
Writers in the Emersonian tradition (Stevens) do 
not transform their difficulties with language 
into the cultural-historical heroics usually 
attributed to modernist writing. 
Some of the tenets modernism proposes, 
belatedness, nostalgia, cultural burden and a 
distrust of language seem inherent to the human 
condition, but Eliot seems to imply that this is 
less important and less interesting than the 
evidence that for over a century the exacerbation 
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of these feelings in literature have been 
attributed by writers of acknowledged power and 
Intelllgence to an unprecedented break In cultural 
continuity and to a remission of some authorlzed 
principies behind language. As critic R. Poirier 
has said, literary modernism is the systematic 
pressing of the claim that many of the anxieties 
which Western Culture has often associated with the 
human condition have been immensely intensified by 
contemporary life. These anxieties were once 
manageable within habitual discourse, but under 
modern conditions, they imply, such talk has 
become increasingly meaningless. From this 
perspective we can say that "modernism happened" 
when reading got to be intimidating or at least 
threatened to become so for those who decided to 
bother with it at all. Thus modernism can be 
identified as a special kind of reading habit or 
reading necessity that springs from the fact of a 
necessary difficulty. Texts must be necessarily 
difficult so as to prove the power of literature as 
a privileged and exclusive form of discourse. By 
its difficulty it tries to reinvoke the 
connections, more or less severed by the growth of 
mass culture, between artist and audience. A select 
community of writer and reader must be created. 
In Eliot's words we detect a self-defensive 
and protective issue. The passage wants to adscribe 
difficulty to social and historical causes only. It 
is an attempt to vulgarize the necessity for 
"difficulty," --now that we know about Eliot's 
personal difficulties and sexual deprivations. And 
Eliot's dictum became the bedrock of literary 
criticism. No one can object to difficulty, but 
the issue Eliot brings up is two-fold. First has to 
do with the KIND of relationship to difficulty that 
literature asks for and the kind of pleasure given 
or denied to that relationship. 
Coming now to the Stevens poem quoted earlier, 
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it seems evident to me evident that it elicits a 
very different klnd of response than the one we get 
from Eliot. We notice no experimenting with free 
forms or vers libre, and a decided absence of 
learned and scholarly referents; these would be the 
most conspicuous elements. More than that, I would 
say that to Eliot's rhetoric of juxtaposition, 
fragmentation--iinage following image in a nominal 
rhetorical move which does away with any space of 
transition or continuity-- we have in Stevens what 
I would cali the trope of transition itself. The 
image of stasis itself with which the poem opens 
seems to be troped once and again into different 
versions of stasis and becoming as spaces of 
transition contained in the different forms of the 
verb "to be" and in the "as if" and "like" 
introduced in the poem as mood of possibility. 
Other alternatives can also be offered; to the 
rhetoric of accumulation Stevens offers a rhetoric 
of bareness and barrenness and to the anxiety that 
Eliot's poem induces, whether it is anxiety over 
the agonizing state of contemporary civilization or 
over the most immediate anxiety of the 
reader/writer at his inability to grasp a fixed 
meaning in the poem, Stevens offers a kind of 
contentedness around what is to be, avoiding any 
kind of transcendent significance or meaning. 
Nothing in the poem leads us out of the poem 
itself, of what those words, in troping, are doing. 
This question of bareness is something to which we 
will return later. All I want to do now is to cali 
attention to these two very different answers to 
the experience of reading poems, which seem to 
illustrate what some critic has called the 
difference between a poetics of difficulty and a 
poetics of density. The apparent simplicity of 
diction in Stevens' poems does not deter us from 
feeling the radical poetical predicament that they 
inscribe. Radical in two main ways: a) as a radical 
poetics of seeing and perceiving the world which 
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finds one of its clearest examples in the poem 
"Anecdote of the Jar" and b) as a radical poetics 
of the perceiving subject, of the "lyrical I" or 
whatever we choose to cali it. Nowhere does this 
seem to be more efficiently achieved than in the 
erasure of the self that takes place in the second 
line of the poem "the reader became the book" 
following which any sense of the human presence in 
the world is eradicated: 
The Truth in a calm world 
In which there is no other meaning, itself 
Is calm, itself is siunmer and night. 
Thus I will posit Eliot's difficulty versus 
Stevens's density. I have already quoted Eliot on 
necessary and self-conscious difficulty. By 
"density" I mean to describe a kind of writing 
which pretends to give a direct access to 
pleasure, but which becomes, on longer 
acquaintance, rather strange and imponderable. 
Shakespeare is a good example, Proust is another. 
Eliot's writing or Pound's are difficult; at first 
encounter they seem resistant, but with the help of 
notes and annotations you master the "difficulty" 
in a sense that you cannot master "density". The 
Joyce of "The Dead" is dense where an episode such 
as "Oxen of the Sun" is "difficult" drawing our 
attention to formal mechanisms which more than the 
Information carried by them, statically communicate 
significance. This kind of difficulty, following 
Modernism's prestige has been privileged, and with 
it a treatment of literature as if it were really a 
communication of knowledge rather than a reach for 
it, whereas density leaves the reader and the 
critic alone, with no guides or grids to help him, 
since it is very often something that strikes the 
ear rather than the eye, something you hear 
happening to volees as they modify words or phrases 
which, at another point, seemed quite clear or 
casual. Density is usually accompanled not by the 
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extruding allusiveness of modernism but by the 
covert allusiveness of troping. 
We saw in Elliot's view of difficulty, in the 
self-conscious manipulating of language a terminal 
confidence in the power of that language to effect 
some sort of change in the world, at least in the 
world of thought, in "the order of things," and at 
the same time, an accumulation of technical 
complexities, of traditional literary series 
within the poem as a form of filling the blankness 
of space of present civilization. Language as 
technology and language as filling the gaps of 
contemporary barrenness and of contemporary 
cultural crisis, as if language could créate order 
out of chaos, as if it had in itself a repository 
of recuperable meanings, as if really the artist 
could créate through his individual chaos some idea 
of order, lost somewhere in the course of human 
destiny. A myth of language and a myth of culture 
and origins. Stevens, on the contrary, following in 
this a .very American tradition, inaugurated by 
Emerson, which sees language as a cultural 
construct, as another form of technology, another 
form of artificiality which stands between the 
reliant self and the world, doesn't seem to believe 
in the redemptive powers of poetic language outside 
of itself, that is to redeem the world or to make 
sense of the world in an age of crisis. For 
Stevens, "poetry is not dirty silence clarified/ 
but silence made still dirtier." If Elliot, and 
Joyce, for that matter, share the illusion that 
language can créate, that the artist is a God 
reproducing that first act of origins, that first 
act of creation, for Stevens the favourite word is 
not creation but engendering, seeing poetic 
language as a transitional event, a transfer of 
already encoded materials within the life of a 
received, communal language that always stands 
within the self and nature and which not only 
constitutes the subject but tropes the subject. 
Stevens is never superficially historical. Instead 
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he finds the difficulties already present in the 
words he uses because the words have already been 
fashloned by bellefs, tradltlons and mythologles 
whlch also make the writlng posslble. He never 
evokes some cultural or historlcal crisis o£ the 
moment in order to give his essential complication 
the quite unnecessary license of historical 
necessity. 
Works o£ literature often cannot come to terms 
even with themselves, they cannot heal the fissures 
they créate, much less the ones we discover in our 
historical experience. "The actual order of things" 
on which the structure and rhetoric of a work may 
cali for provisional support can become so strong 
that it is then impossible to dlsuse it even in the 
interests of human possibilities, which the writer 
wishes to endorse. Since human consciousness 
initiated a separation of the human mind from the 
flow of nature, how can expressions of that 
consciousness, especially in such a fabricated 
structure as literature, also in any way be 
expressions of that nature?. Analogously, how and 
why should an individual whose knowledge about 
himself or herself depends on communities of 
opinión, set out to resist or transform those 
communities? How does anyone's idea of self ever 
get into words when the act of writing itself 
always betrays its distance from the experiences 
the words propose to represent? 
I don't think I'm in a position to answer 
those questions raised by a reading of Stevens's 
poetry. But I think we can go on a little further 
exploring some responses to the density of his 
poetry. 
Wallace Stevens's is a poetry of autumnal and 
wintry landscapes: we have the example of the 
Auroras, to which we could add a massive list which 
will include "An Ordinary Evening in New Heaven," 
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"Page from a Tale," etc. Barrenness and desolation 
are troped once and again into his poetry. 
Bareness except of objects and the world of the 
"there is", with no cultural aggregatlons or layers 
of meanlngful meanlngs, such as the cabin standlng 
in the beach in the loneliness of the Auroras, a 
certaln light falling over it, like in a painting 
by Edward Hopper. Now, this discovery of the 
blankness of space as the metaphorical image of the 
abyss of non-meaning has been considered as one of 
the qulntessentlal creations and literalizations of 
European High Modernism, from The Magic Mountain to 
Women in Love. and in the case of Eliot, is 
accompanied by a consequent horror vacui which 
fabricates a rhetoric of fulfillment, of 
replenishing it with words, rhythms, cyclical times 
and mythical orders. In Stevens this is not so: he 
lets it stand as it is, in itself. That is the 
cabin, that is the world. "The house was quiet and 
the world was calm." As for the cultural blankness 
or bareness of America, he tends to see it as a 
cultural opportunity when it is not an image of 
more personal deprivations. When negatively 
conceived, the denuded landscapes of American 
writing are frequently an image not of cultural 
bareness at all, but of creative-sexual impotence. 
(Remember what we said about engendering). 
Barrenness and sterility is not a cultural 
problem. He, along with other American writers such 
as Frost tends to lócate the problem of literary 
production mostly in language rather than in 
historical circumstance, in the obscure origins of 
language, and in the mysteries of its transmissions 
and transformations. 
It springs from the feeling that the bequest 
of language carries with it certain inducements 
that are not distinguishable from obligations. 
There is nothing sacred on the far side of language 
except the desire that the words should exist. The 
desire itself will atrophy if its inheritors leave 
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language in the forms in which they have received 
it, or even if they rest content for long with any 
new forms they may have given it. "Speech is not 
dirty silence clarified. It is silence made still 
dirtier." 
Thus literature generates its substance, its 
excitements, its rethoric, and its plots often with 
the implicit intention, paradoxically, to get free 
of them and to restore itself to some preferred 
State of naturalness, authenticity and simplicity, 
a space of simplicity, of the "there is" again, 
which is conspicuous in Stevens poetry. The 
implication is that if this could exist in an 
uncorrupted state, then literature itself would be 
unnecessary... literature implicitly idealizes that 
condition of barrenness, that thinness of social 
and cultural circumstance which according to Henry 
James and other observers was supposed to be the 
special plight of American writers. Stevens, 
bareness is salutary: with barrenness the true self 
will emerge: 
As if nothingness contained a métier 
A vital assvmiption, an impermanence 
In its permanent cold, an illusion so desired 
That the green leaves came and coverd the high 
rock,/ 
That the lilaos came and bloomed, like a 
blindness cleaned/ 
Exclaiming bright sight, as it was satisfied, 
In a birth of sight... 
The birth of sight leads us to another 
constant of Stevens*s poetry: its visuality which I 
will confront with Eliot's discursiveness, though 
we could find many other examples of visibility and 
transparency in other high modernist European 
writers. T^ he world, the universe is seen as an 
enigma, as a spectacle and as otherness in which 
the disappearance of man is adumbrated, a world of 
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appearances. This from "A Posteará from the 
Volcano"' 
Children picking up our bones 
Will never know that these were once 
As quick as foxes on the hill; 
Finally, as I see it, Stevens' poetry seem to 
me to trope the possibility of a world seen/without 
a self and to propose different versions of this 
Image without too much anguish, though without much 
chance of eradicating the self through language. 
Of course, this is not new: the most familiar 
instance of this is the one we all know from the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. Obliteration of the self 
in order to have access to a superior order of 
being. The non-being of the mystics, the way up and 
down and the meanderings of Eliot in The Four 
Quartets. There's always in them a recuperative 
mood. This implies a sort of allegiance to 
narrative continuity, to a myth of origins and ends 
and with respect to language an anchor on 
logocentrism. 
From the modern perspective, the great 
ancestor in this process of erasure of the self 
from the universa, in this imagining the works 
without any kind of redemptive power is Nietzsche 
in the well-known passage of "On Truth and Lie in 
an Extra-Moral Sense": 
In some remote córner of the universe, poured 
out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, 
there once was a star on which clever animáis 
inventad knowledge. That was the haughtiest and 
most mendacious minute of "world history" --yet 
only a minute. After na ture had drawn a few breaths 
the star grew cold, and the clever animáis had to 
dle. 
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One might invent such a fable and still not 
have illustrated sufficiently how wretched, how 
shadowy and flightly, how aimless and arbitrary, 
the human intellect appears in nature. There have 
been eternities when it did not exist; and when it 
Is done for agaln, nothing wlll have happened. For 
this intellect has no further mission that would 
lead beyond human life. It is human, rather, and 
only its owner and producer gives it such 
importance, as if the world pivoted around it. But 
if we could communicate with the mosquito, then we 
would learn that it floats through the air with the 
same self-importance, feeling within itself the 
flying center of the world. There is nothing in 
nature so despicable or insignificant that it 
cannot immediately be blown up like a bag by a 
slight breath of this power of knowledge; and just 
as every porter wants an admirer, the proudest 
human being, the philosopher, thinks that he sees 
the eyes of the universe telescopically focused 
from all sides on his actions and thoughts. 
In Nietzsche's quote, spatial images abound, 
images of miniaturization, expansión, telescoping. 
What they suggest is plain enogh: man, especially 
what Nietzsche calis the intellect of man, is no 
more significant in relation to the cosmos than is 
a mosquito in relation to the air in which it 
floats. Each is solipsistically assured that it is 
the center of the world. Now when writing arrives 
at such intransigence readers often succumb to an 
anxiety peculiar to the arnoldian aspect of Anglo-
American literary culture peculiar to Eliot. They 
start worrying about the dangers of modernist or 
radical or uncompromising rhetoric. Is not 
civilization itself imperiled by this rethoric? 
I would propose that there is a very American 
line of response to Nietzsche's predicament: not 
anxiety by exhilaration. Against the apocalyptic 
transcendent tones of mort european responses, more 
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specifically in this case, Eliot's response, 
Stevens's poetry, following a very Emersonian line 
imagines self-obliteration itself and responds by 
troping it and by examining what this troping can 
do to US. There is a sense in which Stevens's 
poetry asks us to get excited by the prospect of 
the end of man, the extinction not only of a 
generic species but of our invention of the human. 
We are asked to get excited about a future which 
will be brought about by our own extinction; we are 
asked to do this by a rhetoric which is itself, 
along with its cultural vestiges, also to become 
extinct. Those animáis which have before called 
themselves human will in some new form have become 
immune to this style of persuasión, immune to style 
itself, deaf to any language shaped by the 
pressures of discarded historical reality, 
including notions about nature and proper uses of 
the body. What we have before us, then, is evidence 
that hvmian beings can exercise a capacity to wish 
themselves radically OTHER than what they are, to 
wish themselves evacuated from "the arrangements of 
knowledge." 
In the poetry of Stevens there is a frequent 
reduction of self-hood to the so called First or 
Primary Idea. Barrenness or bareness, so called-
reduced circumstances, exist for him less in a time 
(historical) sequence, with implications of escape 
and rebirth, than in space, space to be explored 
and contemplated, space in which the human figure 
more or less disappears. Very often the 
inactivation of the will is not seen necessarily as 
a deprivation. The will does not exhibit even that 
self-regarding fear which needs to be overeóme if 
one is to have access to the sublime. Beginning 
tentatively in his first volume Harmonium. Stevens 
concerns himself with the process by which we 
encounter or imagine some elemental reality. 
Twenty years later, in 19A2, he called this reality 
the First Idea which he describes thus in a letter 
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about Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction; "If you take 
the varnish and dirt of generations off a picture, 
you see it in its first idea. If you think about 
the world without its varnish and dirt, you are a 
thinker of the first idea." In this regard, 
consider also the section of the poem "It Must be 
AbstractI" 
How clean the sun when seen in its idea, 
Washed in the remotest cleanliness of a heaven 
That has expelled us and our images... 
The death of one God is the death of all 
Let purple Phoebus lie in umber harvest, 
Let Phoebus slumber and die in autumn umber, 
Phoebus is dead, ephebe. But Phoebus was 
A ñame for something that never could be 
named./ 
There was a project for the sun and is. 
There is a project for the sun. The sun 
Must bear no ñame, gold flourisher, but be 
In the difficulty of what it is to be. 
We are invited to wonder whether behind the 
phenomenal facts, there is nothing. "The sun must 
bear no ñame." Yet the poet, himself an ephebe 
once, is unable to follow his own dictum and he 
proceeds to give his own ñame to the sun. It is 
somewhat suggested that the génesis of gods is 
simply an irresistible consequence of the human 
compulsión to use words. The difficulty of what it 
is to be is not resolved by poetry as in Eliot, it 
is created by poetry. Poetry prevents us from 
seeing what it is to be. 
To reduce anything to a First Idea is not then 
to arrive at "nothing," or at "the thing" itself, 
since the very idea of the thing itself is a great 
poetic invention, a trope pretending not to be one. 
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It i8 to arrive at another fabrication, at the 
fiction that any word can lay claim to being the 
"first" or before anything else. (In the beginning 
was the word). There is always for the poet, as 
Stevens imagines him, an unsatisfiable aspiration, 
the dream of an impossible possibility, to see 
something without having to ñame it, without having 
to think about it, to see it with no dependence of 
the human will, without having to recréate it, to 
see it as would a Transparent Eyeball, with no 
sense of its independence of the human will. 
Stevens's poems suggest the longing to have an 
intercourse with things, cleaner, or more real than 
any permitted by language, which in turn is part of 
the poet's wry joke on himself and on the reader, 
who is to some extent always the imagined product 
of the poet's language. 
As I see it, Stevens's poetry offers us states 
of transition within this mood of self-eradication 
and his rhetorical moves in his poetry tend to 
induce a sense of drift and exploratory meandering, 
as one feeling dissolves into another or both are 
held together in suspended animation. 
One must have a mind of winter 
To regard the frost and the boughs 
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow; 
And have been cold a long time 
To behold the junipers shagged with ice, 
The spruces rough in the distant glitter 
Of the January sun; and not to think 
Of any misery in the sound of wind, 
In the sound of a few leaves, 
Which is the sound of the land 
Full of the same wind 
That is blowing in the same bare place 
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For the listener, who listens in the snow, 
And, nothing himself, beholds 
Nothing that is not here and nothing that Is 
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